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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

"RxQumm" To Br RcoRD?-The
in i9o3 and igio), after defining a
preference, provides in § 6ob that preferences made under certain circumstances may be recovered from the preferred creditor if the latter had "reaWHEN IS A Psoa=NnAL TRANSrSR
BAI ,>vuTcY AcT of 1898 (as amended
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NOTE AND COMMENT
sonable cause to believe" that a preference was to be effected "at the time of
the transfer * * * or of the recording or registering of the transfer if by
law recording or registering thereof is required," such time being within four
months before bankruptcy. Bankrupcty courts have for years been vexed
with the question: When is a transfer "required" to be recorded under this
provision of the Act? Various suggestions as to the meaning of the Act were
made by the various Circuit Courts of Appeals, but the question was finally
authoritatively decided-in part, at least-in x916 in the case of Carey v.
Donohue, :24o U. S. 430. This case decided that a transfer was not "required" to be recorded under the provisions of § 6o unless the requirement
was (to quote from the opinion in that case) "for the protection of creditors,
-the persons interested in the bankrupt estate, and in whose behalf, or in
whose place, the trustee is entitled to act." The decision in Carey v. Donohue
was that an Ohio statute requiring the recording of deeds of land in order
to make them effective as against subsequent bona fide purchasers was not
such a requirement as was meant by §6o, and, of course, the decision is
authoritative only on that point. The decision has therefore left open the
question whether a statute requiring the recording of a transfer in order to
make it effective as against any creditor is sufficient to satisfy the provision
of the statute, or whether the recording act must require the record in order
to make the transfer valid as against the particularkind of creditor, who is
in the particular case, represented by the trustee in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court of the United States has just decided, in Martin v. Commercial
National Bank, 38 Sup. Ct. -, that it is the latter requirement that must
be made.
In a comment on Carey v. Donohue (4 MICH. L. RV. 578, 581) it was said
that the language of the court in that case "seems to indicate pretty clearly
that if the local law requires recording as against any of the classes of persons referred to in § 47a (2) there is a 'requirement' under § 6o. Under
§ 47a (2) the trustee is given 'the rights, remedies and powers of a creditor
holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings' on property in the custody, or
coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court; as to property not in such
custody, he has the 'rights, remedies and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied. The Supreme Court* * * seems
to indicate, without regard to any distinction as to the two classes of property
referred to in § 47a (2), that if the local law requires recording as against
any of the classes of creditors referred to in that section, recording is required under §6o." This interpretation of the decision in Carey v. Donohue
was also made by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
the case of Bunch v. Maloney, 233 Fed. 967, x47 C. C. A. (affirming In re T.
H. Bunch Commission Co., 225 Fed. 243), in which the court had under consideration an Arkansas statute which provided that unrecorded chattel mortgages were void as against subsequent purchasers and lien creditors. Referring to the decision in Carey v. Donohue, the Court said: "Two views
may be taken of the construction given by Carey v. Donohue to the recording
requirement clause of §6ob: First, that it is for the benefit of creditors generally, because their rights are the concern of bankruptcy proceedings, but
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does not embrace those cases in which the requirement is in the interest of
persons outside the purview of the BAxKpTCY AcTr. Second, that as to the
creditors themselves the clause picks up and adopts all the substantive and
procedural limitations of the construction of the statute prescribing the
requirement; and if in local practice creditors of a particular class, like general creditors, could not: invoke the failure to record, a corresponding disability rests upon the trustee in bankruptcy'
After discussing the result
sought to be attained by this section of the BANKxupTcY AcT, namely, the
striking down of all secret liens, the court decided that the trustee in bankruptcy might "invoke the remedy of § 6ob regardless of the local construction
of the statute making a procedural distinction between creditors with a lien
and those without." So also in the case of Hawkins v. Dannenberg Co., 234
Fed. 752, Judge LA~mBDi of the District Court for the Second District of
Georgia, though compelled to a contrary decision by the authority of Martin
v. CommercialNationalBank, m- Fed. 65I, 143 C. C. A. 173, stated his opinion
that under the decision in Carey v. Donohue, a provision of the Georgia statute
making unrecorded mortgages void as against lien creditors only was nevertheless a "requirement" of recording under § 6o of the BANKRUPTCY ACT.
This is the same Georgia statute that was under consideration by the Supreme Court in the principal case.
To the contrary, however, are the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Martin -v. Bank, supra (affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the principal case) and the case of
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. 'Lawson, 237 Fed. 877, decided by
the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, in a case raised under
the Iowa act providing for a recording of conditional sale contracts, and
holding that the trustee in bankruptcy acquired no rights as against previously recorded conditional sale contract because the latter was "required"
to be recorded only as against lien creditors.
The question seems now to be finally settled in such a manner as to leave
little room for doubt, but it is unfortunate that the Act has been so framed as
to make possible the result which has now finally been attained. As is saidby the court in Bunch v. Maloney, supra, in arguing against the construction
now adopted by the Supreme Court, "It is difficult to perceive much result of
consequence in the amendment of igio of § 6ob. Though twice amended for
further effectiveness, it would be doubtful that the section, so. construed,
would accomplish anything of practical value." And the cogency of this
argument seems obvious. It is not the lien creditor that requires protection,
but the general creditor, and it is to be regretted that the Supreme Court,
in choosing between two possible courses open to it, has again, as in Carey.
v. Donohue, taken the path that gives least power to the trustee in bank-,
ruptcy, and most protection to the preferred creditor.
E. H.
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